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TRUSTS-TERMINATION-PROOF OF IMPOSSIBIUTY OF IssuE-The sur-
viving trustee of a testamentary trust petitioned the probate court for 
authority to terminate and distribute the trust in accordance with a com-
promise agreement between all interested persons apart from the possible 
issue of one beneficiary. Undisputed medical testimony was received that 
neither the beneficiary nor his wife were capable of procreation. On a 
question of law certified to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, held, 
remanded with instructions to terminate and distribute the corpus of the 
trust. Termination of a trust in prejudice of the interests of possible future 
issue is permissible when the possibility of such issue is demonstrably 
negligible. In re Bassett's Estate, 190 A.2d 415 (N.H. 1963). 
The traditional view, a product of a medically less sophisticated society, 
is that any human being is conclusively presumed at law to be capable of 
bearing children until death. Mentioned earlier by Sir Edward Coke in 
the context of the fee tail,1 this irrebuttable presumption was firmly 
established as part of the common law by Lord Kenyon in Jee v. Audley.2 
Aside from the influence of the Biblical narrative of Isaac's birth to vener-
able parents,3 the indelicacy of the inquiry and the inconclusiveness of the 
medical evidence were the primary moving considerations.4 
1 COKE, COMMENTARY UPON 1.rrrizroN 28a. 
2 l Cox !124, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787). 
8 Genesis 17:17, 21:5 (to Abraham, aged one hundred, and Sarah, aged ninety). 
4 ll POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 847 (1952). 
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With regard to the termination of trusts,5 the marketability of titles,6 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities,7 the great majority of American courts 
passing on the question have adopted the common-law conclusive presump-
tion. Significantly, however, ever since the leading case of United States v. 
Provident Trust Co.,8 the presumption has been held rebuttable in the 
more pragmatic area of taxation.9 The English courts, moreover, having 
reversed themselves since Jee v. Audley, consistently hold the presumption 
rebuttable by, clear evidence in all contexts except the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.1° Further, several American courts have recently expressed 
dissatisfaction with the conclusive presumption,11 one jurisdiction ap-
parently having reversed an earlier acceptance of the rule,12 while several 
others have narrowed its applicability through liberal interpretation.13 
In the principal case, therefore, the court has adopted a distinct minority 
view in holding the presumption rebuttable when the question is the 
termination of a trust, and it is virtually alone in suggesting that it would 
hold similarly when confronted with the Rule Against Perpetuities.14 
5 See, e.g., P v. Wilmington Trust Co., 188 A.2d 361 (Del. Ch. 1962); Byers v. Beddow, 
106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932). Contra, White v. Weed, 87 N.H. 153, 175 Atl. 814 (1934), 
reaching the result of the principal case although not considering the question in detail. 
6 See, e.g., Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941); Shepherd v. Moore, 
283 Ky. 181, 140 S.W.2d 810 (1940). Contra, Whitney v. Groo, 40 App. D.C. 496 (D.C. Cir. 
1913), holding a title marketable where the only objection was that children thereafter 
born to a seventy-year-old widow would be entitled to an interest in the property. 
'1 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust &: Sav. Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425 
(1920); Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984 (1946); McPherson v. 
First &: Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954). 
8 291 U.S. 272 (1934). 
9 See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943). 
10 See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 538, 543 (1930). 
11 In a jurisdiction which has long accepted the conclusive presumption, it was 
recently suggested that if a situation sufficiently compelling were presented, it might 
relax the rule. McPherson v. First&: Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 19, 81 S.E.2d 386, 398 
(1954). Other courts have indicated that they were following the rule only because of the 
authoritative precedent. See, e.g., P v. Wilmington Trust Co., 188 A.2d 361 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
12 The early Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 
(1877), holding the presumption conclusive, was widely cited. There followed other 
decisions in that court holding similarly. See, e.g., Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 
Atl. 159 (1930). However, all of the recent decisions of the lower Pennsylvania courts have 
held the presumption rebuttable. See, e.g., Bowen Estate, 3 Pa. D. &: C.2d 401 (Philadelphia 
County Ct. 1955); Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123 (Bucks County Ct. 1952); Kelby Estate, 
80 Pa. D. &: C. 1 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1952). The large number of these recent 
clear holdings strongly indicates that the rule has been modified, although the highest 
state court has not reversed itself. 
13 A growing body of decisional law has avoided the conclusive presumption through 
construction of the instrument, finding intent to create interests only in favor of those 
alive when the instrument spoke. REsrATEMENT, PROPERTY § 377, comment b (19-H); 
Newhall, Nibbling at the Rule Against Perpetuities, 29 Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1944, p. 29; see, 
e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 99 A.2d 224 (1953). 
14 Principal case at 417. One other case in relation to the Rule Against Perpetuities has 
refused to follow what it termed the "absurd" doctrine of the conclusive presumption of 
fertility. Exham v. Beamish, [1939] Ir. R. 336. 
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Nonetheless, the principal case is in accord with a very substantial segment 
of modem judicial thought.11• 
Modem medical knowledge, frequently supplemented by statistical 
studies,16 makes evidence as to the possibility of issue extremely reliable.17 
While distrust of medical evidence once dictated a contrary policy, it would 
seem today that a court, exercising its discretion in prescribing the proof 
required, could confidently decide the question of impossibility of issue.18 
Any remaining doubts regarding the possibility of error prejudicial to 
unborn beneficiaries would seem to be adequately removed by requiring a 
bond, which in tum should prove inexpensive due to the relative certainty 
of the medical sciences.19 The second policy consideration of the early 
cases, that of the indelicacy of the inquiry into the ability to procreate, 
likewise seems inapplicable today, as modem courts routinely conduct 
even more "indelicate" inquiries.20 
Additional policy reasons favoring the conclusive presumption have 
recently been advanced. In addition to several questionable arguments 
premised on considerations of uniformity, 21 the concern has been promi-
111 See notes 9-13 supra. A recent commentator on the principal case stated that it was 
"a giant step in the direction of realism . • •• " Leach, Perpetuities: New Hampshire 
Defertilizes the Octogenarians, 77 HARV. L. REv. 279, 283 (1963). 
16 For example, a compilation from the yearly CENSUS BUREAU BIRTH STATISTICS, Live 
Births, table 4, reveals that of 28,938,636 births in the United States between 1923 and 
1936, only 3 were to women of 55 or over. A similar compilation from CENSUS BUREAU 
VITAL STATISTICS, General Tables-Live Births for the decade 1951-1960 reveals that .003 
percent of the births were to women aged 50 or over. 
17 Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123, 130 (Bucks County Ct. 1952). See generally BEHRMAN 
&: GOSLING, FUNDAMENTALS OF GYNECOLOGY (1959). 
18 In practice the Pennsylvania and English courts have generally accepted expert 
medical testimony. See, e.g., Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. &: C. I (Philadelphia County Ct. 1952) 
(medical expert's testimony after exhaustive tests); Leonard's Estate, 60 Pa. D. &: C. 42 
(Dauphin County Ct. 1947) (testimony based on age and atrophy of sexual organs). 
Often the words "children" and "issue" do not include adopted children, notwith-
standing statutes investing the adopted child with a right of inheritance. See Annot., 
144 A.L.R. 670, 674 (1943). In those jurisdictions in which they are included, the possibility 
of adoption will also have to be considered. See Re Barker, II D.L.R.2d 146 (B.C. 1957), 
refusing to terminate a trust partly on ground that it was not demonstrated that plain• 
tiff was legally incapable of adopting a child. 
19 The bond also affords wider latitude to a court's determination of what proof of 
impossibility it considers sufficient. The Pennsylvania courts have generally considered 
the proof of impossibility sufficient protection. Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123, 131 (Bucks 
County Ct. 1952). They have, however, utilized the personal bond when the possibility 
of issue is slight but more than negligible. See, e.g., Bowen Estate, 3 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 401 
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1955). 
20 The very same inquiry is made in cases of contested legitimacy and in tax cases. 
Scott refers to the notion that the inquiry into fertility is indecent as "absurdly prudish." 
3 Scorr, TRusrs § 340.1, at 2498 (2d ed. 1956). 
21 The rather dubious argument has been noted in 23 Cow111. L. REv. 50, 53 (1923), 
that since the presumption throughout the law is held irrebuttable when interests outside 
those of the possible issue or of the persons alleging impossibility are involved, the pre-
sumption should always be held conclusive in the interest of uniformity. Even if true, 
this is hardly consonant with the sound practice of permitting conclusive presumptions 
only when very substantial reasons exist for them. 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 160 (1939). 
Holmes said that scrutiny of the ancient rules is justified and revision a right if the 
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nent that a contrary holding might encourage mercenary operations render-
ing individuals irrevocably sterile.22 It would seem, however, that the 
danger of voluntary submission, especially by a woman, to such an opera-
tion for material reasons is minimized by religious, psychological, and 
legal deterrent £actors.2s 
The conclusive presumption is thus seen as an anachronism from the 
days of Coke, supported only by dubious policy considerations and resting 
principally on adherence to ancient precedent. In addition, a conclusive 
presumption of fertility must inevitably result in the disruption of many 
family estate plans and the frustration of reasonable expectations.24 
Careful drafting may well avoid the problem in particular instances, but 
given holographic wills, perfunctory lawyers, and the frequent probate of 
wills drawn in other states, this solution is idealistic. Moreover, property 
may be needlessly tied up for years. Having found only unconvincing 
reasons supporting the conclusive presumption, and finding compelling 
practical reasons to modify it, the court in the principal case would seem 
to have reached the logical and preferable conclusion. 
The American Law Institute supports the rule of the principal case in 
every area except that of the Rule Against Perpetuities.25 The traditional 
view has been almost unanimously criticized by legal scholars.26 American 
courts have excepted the taxation area and have occasionally avoided its 
application elsewhere.27 Now the principal case has expressly rejected the 
various grounds of policy, ancient and modem, upon which the rule is founded are un-
satisfactory. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 33 (Howe ed. 1963). It would seem that 
uniformity could as well be sought in compliance with this principle. Haggerty v. City 
of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 420, 326 P.2d 957, 965 (1958), noted that an argument 
based on uniformity is especially strong for the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is said 
to contain no "exceptions." In the light of such rules as the "Wait and See" doctrine, 
this conclusion seems to tum upon a semantic point. Regardless, the rebuttable presump-
tion certainly does not promote the predicability necessary to achieve absolute certainty 
in the law. Cf. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.22 (Supp. 1962). Practicality almost 
certainly will demand at least one pure "exception" because of recent advances in bio-
logical sciences. The now real possibility of artificial insemination by refrigerated sperm 
long after the sperm donor's death would seem to void many gifts. 
22 E.g., Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932); Hill v. Sangamon Loan &: 
Trust Co., 295 Ill. 619, 129 N.E. 554 (1920). 
23 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 20, § 340.1. Besides the religious and social aspects, 
several authors advance the psychological theory that, in a woman, the maternal has 
priority over the material. E.g., BEHRMAN & GOSLING, op. cit. supra note 17, at 383; REIK, 
OF LOVE AND Lus-r 524 (1959). Consider here also the very real possibility, and therefore 
effective deterrent, that a court of equity might refuse relief because of "unclean hands." 
Equity will not afford relief to one who has violated conscience or good faith. 2 PoMEROY, 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 398 (5th ed. 1941). 
24 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 24.22 (Casner ed. 1952). 
25 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 274 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 340, comment 
e (1959). 
26 E.g., 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 24, § 24.22; BOGERT, TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 1007 (2d ed. 1962); 3 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 347; Leach, supra 
note 15; 23 CoLUM. L. REv. 50 (1923); 34 M1cH. L. REv. 453 (1936). 
27 See notes 9, 11-13 supra. 
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traditional view. Legal opinion is thus increasingly adopting what appears 
the preferable rule-a presumption of the ability to procreate rebuttable 
by clear evidence. The strong judicial endorsement here given to the 
view held by legal scholars should certainly have a wide influence on the 
future course of litigation and decision. 
Charles F. Niemeth 
